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This paper is concerned with changes in the distribution of income sources in Uruguay after
the late eighties. An apparent stability in the distribution of total incomes is hiding deep
transformations affecting the generation of that income. The distribution across all income
earners at the end of the eighties exhibited two well-distinguished poles, each associated
with one of the main income sources: pension benefits and wages. This bimodality diminished
during the nineties due to the reduction in polarization by income sources. In the same
period we find that in the case of labor earnings there was a net transfer of population mass
from the middle of the distribution to both extremes, which results in an increasing polarization
within this income source. This phenomenon resembles the Anglo-Saxon experience of the
shrinking middle class.
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I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the evolution of income distribution by
sources in Uruguay between 1989 and 1997, the last year of available uniform data.
Low levels of inequality compared to other Latin American Countries have
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characterized its income distribution. Papers on the topic developed by Bucheli
and Rossi (1994) and Vigorito (1998) show that income distribution has not varied
very much during recent years. This is in contrast to the situation experienced by
the remaining Latin American countries, which have increased their levels of
inequality.
Other studies show, however, greater inequalities in certain components of
household income. Bucheli and Rossi (1994) reveal important changes in the
distribution of pensions; Miles and Rossi (1999) and Gradín and Rossi (2000)
indicate a growing inequality in the distribution of wages since the beginning of
the 1990s. According to this last paper, between 1990 and 1996 the Gini index grew
by 17 per cent in Montevideo and by 12 per cent in the rest of urban Uruguay, the
increase in the Theil index was even larger (36 and 30 per cent respectively). The
same paper demonstrates that the wage distribution in Uruguay also increased its
degree of bipolarity, shrinking in the middle.
The evolution of the distribution of income in Uruguay has to be seen in the
context of important changes in the labor market and in the social protection
system. This paper is concerned with these distributive transformations, providing
empirical evidence of how an apparent stability in total income distribution is
hiding intense transformations in the generation of income from different sources:
labor income, pensions and self-employment income.1
In our view, the transformations occurred in the income distribution by sources
in Uruguay can be easily characterized from the point of view of polarization
because, as will be demonstrated in the next sections, they involved two different
processes going in opposite directions regarding polarization in society.
On the one hand, the well-known phenomenon of the disappearing or shrinking
middle class is found within the distribution of labor income for the same period in
the way described by Wolfson (1997): “A more polarized income distribution is
one that is more spread out from the middle, so there are fewer individuals or
families with middle level incomes. In addition there is a sense that this spreading
out is also associated with a tendency toward bimodality, a clumping of formerly
middle level incomes at either higher or lower levels” (p. 402).
On the other hand, in this paper we show that a fundamental change appears in
the underlying poles of the distribution of total income across earners, so that
starting from a highly polarized distribution, polarization substantially decreased,
at least as far as the phenomenon of polarization was summarized by Esteban and
Ray (1994): “Suppose that the population is grouped into significantly-sized
clusters, such that each cluster is very similar in terms of the attributes of its
1 Other less relevant (and more irregular) incomes have been omitted, as other social benefits
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members, but different clusters have members with very dissimilar attributes. In
that case we would say that the society is polarized” (p. 819). In our case, clusters
are given by the different way households obtain their main income: the labor
market or the pensions system.
As a consequence, in order to summarize distributional changes we will use
polarization indices because measures that are consistent with the Lorenz dominance
criterion are not adequate in this context. Indeed they cannot distinguish between
convergence to the global mean and convergence to local poles. Only an approach
based on polarization indices is able to adequately make this crucial distinction.2
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II focuses on Uruguay’s
economic framework, Section III deals with changes in labor earnings as well as in
total incomes, which are analyzed through the estimation of their respective
underlying densities. Using the same tool, section IV analyzes retirement incomes.
In order to summarize distributional changes, sections V and VI present the results
of computing polarization indices from an extension of Esteban and Ray’s
contribution to the measurement of polarization. The last section summarizes the
main conclusions.
II. The economic framework
Uruguay is a particular country within the Latin American context. Uruguay is
mainly an urban country. Half the total urban population lives (and nearly two
thirds of the economic activity is carried out) in the metropolitan area of Montevideo.
The other half of the urban population and one third of economic activity are
dispersed among the rest of urban Uruguay, which is composed of cities generally
not larger than 30,000 inhabitants.
The macroeconomic framework in the country can be summarized as follows. A
deep recession occurred at the beginning of the eighties but the Uruguayan
economy substantially grew from the recovery of democracy in 1985 until 1994. By
1995 the country underwent a new period of recession that finished in 1996. This
period was also characterized by a stabilization plan that considerably reduced
inflation, and provided an increasing opening of the Uruguayan economy within
the free trade area of MERCOSUR with Argentina and Brazil. A major reform of the
state was conducted but, unlike other Latin American countries, to a great extent,
public intervention was preserved.
2 Note that in both cases inequality goes down, while convergence to a unique central pole
involves less polarization and convergence to two distant local points moves society to a
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Regarding the labor market, the country experienced an increase in the rate of
women’s participation, as well as in the level of education of the new entrants. A
demand favoring the more skilled people was also observed. Furthermore, this
labor market experienced a crucial institutional reform affecting the degree of
centralization in wage negotiation. Until 1990 wage increases were decided in
bargaining councils by unions, employers and government representatives, adjusted
three times a year for the entire economic sectors and uniformly for workers from
Montevideo and the rest of urban Uruguay. A decentralization process began in
1990, with wage increases decided on a local level and bargaining councils practically
disappearing. This fact, jointly with the fall in industrial employment, where unions
had had more preponderance, could explain the important de-unionization process
observed in the Uruguayan work force, where membership is not compulsory.
While in 1986 four out of ten workers were members of labor unions, in 1997 the
proportion had diminished to one out of ten.
Another important change, from the point of view of its potential consequences
in the distribution of income, took place in the social protection system and is
related to the indexation of pensions. Before 1989, pensions were adjusted annually
and linked to the wage index. Given that the inflation rate used to be high, the
government was allowed to make payments in advance. The reform, approved by
referendum in December of 1989, established that increases had to take place in the
same month as public sector wages (more than one per year) and the rise had to be
equivalent to the variation of the wage index within the adjustment period. This
fact, in a context of high inflation rates implied substantial improvements in the
level of pensions, moving this group up in the global distribution of income.
This study is based on data from the Household Survey of Uruguay from 1989
through 1997 (Encuesta de Hogares, Instituto Nacional de Estadística).3 This
survey has been carried out, in its present format, every month since 1981; its
frame is the civilian population of Uruguay (RUU), broken down into one survey
for Montevideo and another for the rest of urban Uruguay. It contains individual
data on monthly labor earnings, non-labor earnings, age, sex, educational level,
hours worked per week, marital status, occupation characteristics, and other relevant
variables. All monetary variables have been deflated using the consumer price
index of December of 1996. Descriptive statistics describing the data set and the
variables to be used are shown in Table 1.
3 In 1998, the survey incorporated relevant changes affecting the sample. Among them, the
new sample is based on the new 1996 Census; it changed the method for replacing households;
and it included new villages from the greater Montevideo and excluded others. All these changes
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
  Labor* Pensions** Total*** Household’s
equivalent
income****
1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997
Montevideo
Observations 8,708 7,950 7,358 8,498 18,085 18,937 19,247 16,746
% 46.5 42.3 57.5 60.7 51.6 50.9 30.3 29.8
Mean 5,754 6,350 2,437 3,535 5,138 5,695 3,199 3,454
Standard Deviation 5,381 6,219 2,635 3,317 5,869 6,207 3,253 3,297
RUU
Observations 10,032 10,863 5,442 5,499 16,958 18,302 44,217 39,466
% 53.5 57.7 42.5 39.3 48.4 49.1 69.7 70.2
Mean 3,286 3,580 1,447 2,105 2,866 3,312 2,832 3,029
Standard Deviation 2,424 3,280 4,278 1,997 4,079 3,355 2,852 2,960
Uruguay (total)
Observations 18,740 18,813 12,800 13,997 35,043 37,239 63,464 56,212
Mean 4,433 4,750 2,016 2,973 4,038 4,524 2,943 3,156
Standard Deviation 4,256 4,942 3,466 2,955 5,208 5,152 2,955 3,046
Notes: All monetary units are expressed in constant pesos of December, 1996. * All employees
with a positive amount of labor earnings. ** All individuals receiving a pension benefit of any
source. *** Labor and self-employment earnings plus pension benefits. All individuals receiving
one of these sources. **** Household’s equivalent income from any source, assuming redistribution
within the household and with OECD equivalent scales (weight 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for the
rest, and 0.5 for each child).
III. Distributional changes in the labor market and total income
In order to analyze how the labor income distribution changed in Uruguay
during the nineties, in a first stage we estimate densities for labor income,
considering only those individuals who earned some positive amount. As a
consequence, we inspect how the whole distribution changed over time, rather
than concentrating on particular points. These densities are estimated with the
non-parametric technique known as kernels, without any assumption about the
shape of the distribution. It smoothes the density avoiding the noise induced by
the use of a sample instead of the whole population. We estimate a function
) (y f over the logarithm of incomes y=(y1, ..., yn) in the sample assuming that there
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where h(.) is the adaptive bandwidth (locally adjusted), and K(.) is the kernel
function, which is Gaussian in our case.4
Figure 1.A displays how labor income (in logarithms) distribution changed in
Uruguay from 1989 to 1997, with income expressed in real terms. Given that the
average labor income did decrease, the distribution shifted a little to the left. A
specific distributive change stands out in the Figure, showing a prominent shrinkage
in the middle of the distribution, while both extremes substantially increased in
size. The phenomenon is referred to in the labor economics literature as the
disappearing middle class, drawing the attention of a number of researchers since
the second half of the eighties in the US.5 In other words, the distribution generated
by the labor market became more polarized as Wolfson (1994 and 1997) or Esteban
and Ray (1991, 1993 and 1994) conceptualized this notion.
The estimation of the same densities - separately for Montevideo and the rest
of urban Uruguay (RUU) - shows that workers from Montevideo contributed to
the increase in the upper tail while workers from the rest of urban Uruguay
contributed to the enlargement of the lower tail (Figure 1.B). Comparing the densities
in both distributions we observe that they moved apart from each other. While the
density corresponding to Montevideo shifted to the right, that corresponding to
the rest of urban Uruguay moved towards the left. In both cases the mode is less
prominent in 1997 than it was in 1989.
What is the reason for this increasing polarization in labor earnings? In Gradín
and Rossi (2000), for instance, we show that the distribution of wages in Montevideo
presented increasing polarization by qualification and age, which was consistent
with increasing returns to education and experience. In the rest of urban Uruguay
there was evidence of increasing wage polarization by sector (public versus private)
and branch of activity. In both cases, Montevideo and rest of urban Uruguay,
polarization by sex declined, showing that the gender gap did not explain this
tendency towards augmenting polarization.
j " (1)
4 We refer to Silverman (1986) and subsequent literature for details regarding this technique.
5 A major part of these studies were published in the Monthly Labor Review, but other similar
studies were conducted in different countries and on different dates.
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B. Montevideo and the rest of urban Uruguay (RUU)
One could expect at first that, given this clear polarization increase in labor
income distribution and considering that wages account for more than a half of
incomes, we would find a similar trend if we lumped all income sources together. In JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 56
the remainder of this section we will show that it was not the case in Uruguay for
the period we are considering.
Figures 2.A and 2.B show the changes in densities of the distribution of total
individual income across any type of earner for Montevideo and the rest of urban
Uruguay. Total income includes labor income, pensions and self-employment
income, omitting other less-relevant sources of income. It is shown in Figure 2.A
that in 1989 the distribution in Montevideo was quite bimodal; a great proportion
of the population was gathering at two well-defined poles that were significantly
separated from each other. This bimodality, however, almost disappears by 1997.
A similar trend is found outside Montevideo in Figure 2.B, the difference being
that the first mode is even more outstanding in 1989, and though smoothed during
the nineties, it still persists in 1997. The distribution for the whole Uruguay (omitted
here), that is just the weighted average of both regions, reproduces the same
process. Thus, we cannot say that labor income polarization resulted in a higher
polarization in total income. Some other force was acting in the opposite direction,
compensating this trend. The next section identifies this force as the big shift
experienced by pension benefits.
IV. Distributional changes and retirement pensions
Whenever a bimodal distribution is found, one should immediately inspect
whether or not this distribution is just the result of summing up two different sub-
distributions, in this case two income-generation processes, each exhibiting a
different unique mode so that bimodality results from aggregation.
In this section we show that, indeed, the two modes found in the distribution
of total income in both Uruguayan urban regions in 1989 were the result of
aggregating income from two distinct sources, labor income and retirement
pensions, which account for almost 80% of total income. This is shown in Figures
3.A and 3.B for both years and areas. For this, we make an exhaustive partition of
the population according to their main source of income: labor, retirement pensions
and self-employment incomes. This breakdown leads the total income density to
be the weighted sum of sub-population densities, with the weights being respective
population shares. We omit the representation of the third source, self-employment,
to allow a better view of distributional changes.
In Montevideo in 1989 (Figure 3.A) both main sources of income, labor and
retirement pensions, show two distant poles separated by a great distance. These
poles correspond to the modes observed in the aggregate density (Figure 2.A). So INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME SOURCES IN URUGUAY 57
Figure 2. Densities of total income
A. Montevideo
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we can interpret the generation of income in 1989 as the result of two different
stochastic processes, where one’s position in the income space substantially
depends on which is the main source of income. One will be in a higher position JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 58
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provided income is obtained mainly in the labor market, and in a lower position in
the case of the pension system. The result of this is a high degree of polarization
in total income. But we find that the distribution by income sources changed
during the nineties in two different aspects. On one hand, the density of those INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME SOURCES IN URUGUAY 59
mainly receiving retirement pensions moved to the right, approaching that of labor
income earners; on the other, labor income earners now exhibit a higher degree of
internal dispersion. We observe, as a consequence, a significant increase in
overlapping between both groups of income receivers, which finally explains that
the bimodality in the aggregate distribution gradually faded with time. In 1997 the
distinction between labor income and retirement pension recipients appears to be
much less crucial than in 1989. A quite similar result is found in the RUU (Figure
3.B) with both income sources displaying a substantially lower degree of internal
dispersion than in the capital, especially visible in the case of those receiving
pension benefits. In both urban areas the new modes are less prominent than
before.
V. Polarization in Uruguay: Income groups
So far we have devoted the analysis to the direct observation of densities. The
problem with this approach is that it does not allow to quantify the phenomenon
we are analyzing. In this section we summarize distributive changes in relative
income using a battery of indices to be able to measure the intensity of these
distributional changes.
In order to measure polarization, several indices have been proposed in the
literature. Apart from the contributions of Wolfson and Esteban and Ray, one can
mention Chakravarty and Majumder (2001), Wang and Tsui (2000) or Zhang and
Kanbur (2001). In this paper we use the index proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994),
obtained following an axiomatic approach, but due to its difficulties in being
implemented in personal income distributions, we follow the extension proposed
in Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999) to make it operative in this context. So, for a
given distribution f we compute polarization as follows:
First, we fit a 2-spike distribution to the original density, such that in preserving
the same income it minimizes the error of representing f by this degenerated
distribution. This defines groups as two income-classes such that in the
representation all members in each group are grouped into its respective mean
income. The error is defined as the intragroup dispersion within the group as
measured by Gini index of inequality. The same is undertaken for a 3-group
representation.6
Secondly, we compute polarization in the 2- and in 3-spike distributions using
6 The same exercise was conducted with other number of groups posing the same results. In
Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999) it is shown that the measure proposed by Wolfson (1994) is a
particular case of this approach when there are two groups of identical size. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 60
Esteban and Ray’s index (simple polarization). This is polarization between-groups,
from which we subtract the error of the representation (intragroup heterogeneity),
as increasing dispersion within the groups should reduce overall polarization.
Then, for r being the 2-spike (or 3-spike) optimal representation, the measure
for extended polarization is:
[] ) ( ) ( , r b r a r a G f G - ) , ER( = ) P(f; -  ,                                                             (2)
where a is a parameter indicating the sensitivity to polarization (and so the distance
to the notion of inequality) that lies in the [1,1.6] interval in order to fulfill a set of
axioms; b is the weight assigned to the error term; G is the Gini coefficient of
inequality and ER is the index of simple polarization proposed in Esteban and Ray
(1994) computed over the 2 or 3-spike distribution with average incomes (y1, y2, y3)





j i j i y y p p ER
a r a
1 ) ; ( .                                                                          (3)
In the case of b =0, equation (2) simplifies to (3).
Results for 1989 and 1997 by main income sources across individuals in Uruguay
are presented in Table 2, together with total income (the sum of all sources) and
households’ equivalent income. In this Table, extended polarization as defined in
(2) is computed in Part A for two cases: bi-polarization (2 groups) and tri-polarization
(3 groups), providing the corresponding figures for simple polarization according
to equation (3). For the computation of polarization we take an intermediate value
of a (=1.3), but results are quite similar with a higher and a lower level (1.6 and 1).
The parameter b in extended polarization is 1, giving the same weight to both
components, simple polarization and intragroup heterogeneity.7 In Table 2 Part B,
we present results for the well-known Gini index of inequality for the whole
population, as well as the within-groups component (in 2 and 3 group cases),
called intragroup heterogeneity (second term of  equation 2). Part C of Table 2
displays the size of groups in the case of tri-polarization under two assumptions:
when these three groups are obtained endogenously (minimizing intragroup
7 In Gradín (2002) there is a justification for this value of b. Under certain conditions it is the
largest value consistent with the general principle that a progressive transfer within groups
increases bipolarization while with a progressive transfer between groups bipolarization is
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Table 2. Polarization in Uruguay, 1989-97
           Labor              Pensions       Total income      Households’
                                                 equivalent
              income
1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997
A. Polarization
2 groups  -extended 0.094 0.112 0.113 0.125 0.126 0.127 0.105 0.111
- simple 0.208 0.237 0.229 0.239 0.257 0.256 0.218 0.227
3 groups - extended 0.110 0.132 0.119 0.135 0.152 0.150 0.118 0.125
-  simple 0.164 0.190 0.177 0.190 0.210 0.209 0.170 0.178
B. Inequality (Gini)
Whole population 0.382 0.436 0.430 0.434 0.463 0.468 0.393 0.414
Intragroup heterogeneity
- 2 groups 0.114 0.125 0.117 0.115 0.130 0.129 0.113 0.116
- 3 groups 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.055 0.059 0.058 0.052 0.053
C. Middle income group size
Endogenous (minimum
intragroup heterogeneity)* 0.401 0.380 0.356 0.327 0.376 0.363 0.378 0.370
Exogenous ** - 75-125%
average 0.312 0.256 0.214 0.205 0.236 0.221 0.276 0.252
- 60-140%
average 0.504 0.418 0.409 0.356 0.379 0.365 0.448 0.423
D. Income difference
between extreme groups *** 5.2 6.7 6.2 6.3 7.7 7.8 5.4 6
Notes: * An endogenous middle class means that cut-off points to construct the 3 groups
distribution are obtained through minimization of intragroup heterogeneity. These are the
groups used to compute polarization with 3 groups. ** An exogenous middle class means that
cut-off points to construct the 3 groups distribution are fixed arbitrarily to be a percentage to
the mean, with results provided in two different cases: between 75 and 125% of the mean and
between 60 and 140%. *** Ratio of the richest group’ income to the poorest’ one in the 3 groups
distribution. The case of individual total incomes only considers those people with a positive
amount of any source and no redistribution within households is assumed. In the case of
households’ incomes, perfect redistribution within households is assumed with all people belonging
to the sample (regardless of being income receivers or not). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 62
heterogeneity) and when they are defined in an exogenous way (assuming that the
middle group has incomes lying in the range 25% above and below average income,
and the same with the percentage being 40%). Finally, Part D of Table 2 provides
the ratio of the richest group average income to the poorest one (in the three-
group case).
These results show that both main sources of income experienced an increase
in extended polarization for two and three underlying income classes, but in a
different way. Focusing in the three-group case8, we find that in 1997 wage earners
were 20% more polarized in labor incomes than in 1989 (the index moved from 0.110
to 0.132). This shift in polarization was due to a big increase in the distance between
extreme groups. The richest group mean income was 5.2 times that of the poorest
in 1989, while this ratio was 6.7 in 1997. The increase in polarization in pensions,
however, was more limited (from 0.119 to 0.135, that is 13%) and had nothing to do
with increasing distance between extreme groups. Indeed, the ratio of incomes
between the richest and the poorest groups appears to be quite stable (from 6.2 to
6.3). Polarization increased because of extreme groups based on pensions being
internally more homogenous (within-group dispersion went from 0.058 to 0.055)
and because of increasing size of endogenous extreme groups (there was a 32.7%
of population in the middle group in 1997 versus 35.6% in 1989). Labor income also
shows a substantial increase in inequality, Gini rises from 0.382 to 0.436, in contrast
with stability in the case of pensions (around 0.430).
How did all these distributional changes affect the distribution of total income?
We see in the third column of results in Table 2 that it remained unchanged, only a
low increase in Gini coefficient is found (from 0.463 to 0.468), with no relevant
change in polarization (from 0.152 to 0.150). If we rather look at the variable that
ultimately is relevant for welfare, household equivalent income9, we see that it
slightly increased (5-6%) in both polarization (from 0.118 to 0.125) and inequality
(from 0.393 to 0.414). However, after the previous analysis we can conclude that it
was the result of household formation rather than the result of the process
generating incomes. Elements such as the correlation between income sources in
a household, the number of earners or the household composition might explain
this increasing inequality and polarization.
8 The discussion for two groups does not differ too much. Results are included in Table 2 for
robustness.
9 Defined using OECD equivalent scales (weighting 1 the first adult, .7 the rest of adults and .5
children) and weighting each household according to the number of members. In this case all
individuals have incomes, as we attribute to each person the adjusted income of her household. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME SOURCES IN URUGUAY 63
Table 3. Polarization in Montevideo and the rest of urban Uruguay: 1989-97
Montevideo                           Labor               Pensions            Total            Household
1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997
A. Polarization
2 groups - extended 0.097 0.115 0.132 0.138 0.124 0.127 0.100 0.115
- simple 0.208 0.235 0.255 0.259 0.254 0.255 0.207 0.231
3 groups - extended 0.109 0.130 0.142 0.152 0.147 0.149 0.109 0.129
- simple 0.162 0.186 0.202 0.208 0.207 0.207 0.159 0.181
B. Inequality (Gini)
Whole population 0.384 0.432 0.462 0.452 0.461 0.466 0.372 0.416
Intragroup heterogeneity
- 2 groups 0.111 0.121 0.123 0.121 0.130 0.128 0.106 0.115
- 3 groups 0.053 0.056 0.060 0.056 0.059 0.058 0.050 0.053
C. Middle income group size (3 groups)
Endogenous (min. intragroup
heterogeneity) 0.384 0.376 0.341 0.348 0.379 0.369 0.378 0.366
Exogenous - 75-125%
average 0.294 0.244 0.185 0.203 0.232 0.224 0.289 0.249
- 60-140%
average 0.490 0.406 0.347 0.335 0.383 0.366 0.478 0.416
D. Income difference
between extreme groups 5.2 6.5 7.3 7.1 7.6 7.7 4.9 6.0
A. Polarization
2 groups - extended 0.096 0.108 0.088 0.103 0.129 0.122 0.100 0.100
- simple 0.206 0.227 0.196 0.207 0.253 0.243 0.209 0.206
3 groups - extended 0.112 0.126 0.095 0.103 0.148 0.137 0.110 0.109
- simple 0.163 0.181 0.148 0.154 0.204 0.192 0.162 0.159
B. Inequality (Gini)
Whole population 0.365 0.405 0.373 0.378 0.445 0.434 0.378 0.370
Intragroup heterogeneity
- 2 groups 0.110 0.119 0.108 0.103 0.124 0.121 0.110 0.106
- 3 groups 0.051 0.055 0.053 0.051 0.056 0.056 0.052 0.049 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 64
Table 3. (Continued) Polarization in Montevideo and the rest of urban Uruguay: 1989-97
Rest of urban Uruguay               Labor               Pensions            Total            Household
1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997 1989 1997
C. Middle income group size (3 groups)
Endogenous (min. intragroup
heterogeneity) 0.405 0.394 0.390 0.364 0.365 0.366 0.380 0.380
Exogenous -  75-125%
average 0.327 0.287 0.304 0.258 0.237 0.245 0.288 0.293
-  60-140%
average 0.504 0.456 0.558 0.475 0.368 0.382 0.479 0.485
D. Income difference
between extreme groups 4.9 5.9 4.9 4.9 7.0 6.5 5.0 4.9
Note: The case of individual total incomes only considers those people with a positive amount
of any source and no redistribution within households is assumed. In the case of households’
incomes, perfect redistribution within households is assumed with all people belonging to the
sample (regardless of being income receivers or not).
Table 3 displays the same results separately for Montevideo and rest of the
urban country. In 1989 both urban regions showed similar distributive patterns,
but the increase in labor income polarization was larger in Montevideo (from 0.109
to 0.130, that is 20%). Another significant difference between both regions is that
total income polarization and inequality were reduced in the rest of urban Uruguay
(from 0.148 to 0.137 in the case of extended polarization), being almost constant in
Montevideo, while household income polarization and inequality were substantially
increased only in Montevideo (extended polarization increased from 0.109 to 0.129).
In the rest of urban Uruguay, household income polarization was rather constant
or even declined (from 0.110 to 0.109).
In order to show how increasing polarization took place we account for the
decline in the middle class in two different ways. First, we exogenously define the
middle-income group to be all people whose income is higher than 75% of the
average and lower than 125%; alternatively 60%-140% is also provided.
Additionally, we provide the endogenous middle-income group used to compute
polarization indices shown above (with 3 groups). In this case the interval defining
the middle is different in each distribution, varying with time. With both definitions
of the middle-groups, also presented in Part C of Tables 2 and 3, we observe a
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when considering different income sources. In the exogenous case (75-125%), for
instance, the middle group for labor income earners shrank in Uruguay from 31.2%
to 25.6% between 1989 and 1997. The middle group is larger in size in the rest of
urban Uruguay than in Montevideo. However the decline in size is much lower if
we consider all earners (from 37.6% to 36.3%) or households (from 37.8% to 37.0%).
Furthermore the income ratio of top group to bottom group income in the three-
groups optimal distribution -Part D of Tables- goes up in all three cases, even if the
change is definitely stronger for labor income.
VI. Polarization in Uruguay: Groups by income sources
There were small changes in the level of polarization of total income and of
household equivalent income in Uruguay between 1989 and 1997. The assumption
in the previous section was that groups were formed by income classes. What if
we assume that individual attachment to a group regards the income source rather
than the income level? For this we follow Gradín (2000), using the Esteban, Gradín
and Ray approach computing polarization for exogenous sub-populations, which
are given in this case by the main income source (r c) in both, total earners and
household income. 10 Thus, we compute:
( ) ( ) , ,   , ,
c b r a r a + , =
c f P f GP
with the function P defined as in (2).
Table 4 summarizes the results of computing polarization by groups, where
groups are defined according to which is the main source of income (pensions,
wages or self-employment income). Polarization by groups computes GP as in
equation (4), indicating the level of polarization originated by this particular partition
(Part A of Table 4), which is the result of simple polarization between groups
ER(pc, a) - Part B of Table 4 - minus intragroup heterogeneity [G(f) - G(pc)] - Part
C of Table 4 - plus the normalizing term b ( = 1).
Table 4 shows, as expected from the graphical analysis, that polarization by
income sources substantially declined in Uruguay. This is true regardless of the
variable we analyze, total income (from 0.816 to 0.716) or household equivalent
income (from 0.705 to 0.647), and occurred in both urban regions. In both
10 Different approaches have been proposed in order to deal with polarization under exogenous
sub-populations. For instance, D’Ambrosio (2001) uses an alternative extension of Esteban
and Ray’s approach, replacing distances in terms of average incomes with an index of distance
between sub-distributions. Zhang and Kanbur (2001) propose the use of the ratio “between-
group” to “within-group” inequality.
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Table 4. Polarization by main income source of income in Uruguay, 1989-97
                      Individual total incomes      Households’ income
1989 1997 1989 1997
A. Polarization by groups (GP) 0.816 0.716 0.705 0.647
B. Polarization between groups (ER) 0.108 0.067 0.035 0.021
population shares Labor 0.518 0.489 0.635 0.590
(sum = 1) Pensions 0.324 0.344 0.179 0.212
Self-employed 0.158 0.168 0.186 0.198
Relative incomes Labor 1.153 1.101 0.990 0.985
(average = 1) Pensions 0.545 0.707 0.803 0.901
Self-employed 1.434 1.307 1.224 1.151
C. Intragroup heterogeneity 0.292 0.351 0.330 0.374
(Gini within the group)
Labor 0.382 0.436 0.367 0.402
Pensions 0.428 0.429 0.396 0.381
Self-employed 0.513 0.520 0.436 0.465
D. Overlapping Overall 0.711 0.791 0.870 0.919
(index I) Labor-pensions 0.314 0.479 0.597 0.694
Note: The case of individual total incomes only considers those people with a positive amount
of any source and no redistribution within households is assumed. In the case of households’
incomes, perfect redistribution within households is assumed with all people belonging to the
sample (regardless of being income receivers or not).
geographical areas the main source of reduction was the approximation between
income poles, especially between labor earners and pensioners. Indeed, attending
to relative incomes shown in Part B of Table 4, in Uruguay pensioners improved
from 55% of the global average in total income to 71%, while self-employment and
labor earners declined from 143 and 115% to 131 and 110%. Furthermore, groups
generally became internally more dispersed; intragroup heterogeneity increased
from 0.292 to 0.351 in the case of total income. However, this varies across groups
because while inequality within labor earners increased throughout Uruguay, from
0.382 to 0.436, dispersion within pensioners remained stable (0.428-0.429). Similar
results are found in the column for household equivalent income and in both
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Intragroup heterogeneity as measured by Gini, given that groups overlap, can
be re-written as the weighted sum of Gini for each group, where each group is
weighted accordingly to its population share and the degree of overlapping with
the whole population.11 Thus, the measure (4) allows us to take into account the
degree of overlapping among sub-distributions, through the index I. For qi indicating
the ith sub-population share, the index is:
i i
i
q I = I å  ,
where Ii indicates the overlapping between the ith sub-distribution and the overall
population and comes from the breakdown of the Gini index of inequality, such
that we re-write the intragroup heterogeneity as:
i i i
i
c I f G s = ) (f, ) ( å r e
and it can be expressed as the weighted sum of each Iij representing the overlapping
between the ith and the jth sub-distributions, weights being respective population
shares:
q I = I j ij
j
i S
We refer to Gradín (1999 and 2000) for details. Given that Iij¹Iji, for two sub-
populations i and j we will compute the overlapping between them as:
j ji i ij ij q I q I = I +
*
According to Yitzhaki (1994), based on Laswell’s notion of stratification, “perfect
stratification occurs when the observations of each group are confined to a specific
range, and the ranges of groups do not overlap. Hence we can view overlapping as
non-stratification” (p. 148). According to this notion, Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991)
and Yitzhaki (1994) develop overlapping indices behaving quite similarly to the
indices used in this section, the latter being more directly connected to our measures
of polarization.
The results in Part D of Table 4 show that the degree of overall overlapping
increased between 1989 and 1997 in both geographical areas for both total and
household equivalent income, but the increase was larger in the former case (from
0.870 to 0.919 in the whole country). Of special relevance was the large increase in
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overlapping between labor earners and pensioners subgroups in all cases (from
0.597 to 0.694 in the country), reducing social stratification or segmentation due to
income sources in Uruguay at the same time that polarization was reduced.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown, using kernel densities and polarization summary
indices, that income distribution in Uruguay showed a marked change between
1989 and 1997. The change affected the process generating income via different
sources such as the labor market and the pensions system, exhibiting a process of
declining polarization due to an approximation between income poles with a
significant decline in social stratification.
However, an increasing polarization was observed within labor market earners.
This polarization was characterized by a decline in the size of the middle-income
group with an enlargement of the tails. The lower tail was enlarged due to the
worsening of the economic position of middle-income workers in the rest of urban
Uruguay, and the enlargement of the upper tail was due to the improvement of
Montevideo middle-income workers.
The improvement in the position of pensioners compensated the increasing
polarization within the labor market and pensions system. Thus total income did
not experience an increase in overall polarization while household equivalent income
increased a little in polarization, but for reasons other than income sources.
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